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Abstract
In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is imple-
mented by a modiﬁed version of Perry and Reny’s (1994) non-cooperative
game. Speciﬁcally, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption
of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The core is an important solution concept with intuitive appeal. It is an ap-
propriate solution for situations where players have unhampered ability to sign
binding agreements. Two lines of research have recently been prominent. The
ﬁrst line of research extends the core concept to situations with externalities
across coalitions. The α- and r-cores are based on a partition function instead
of a characteristic function. Important new solution concepts have been pro-
posed by Ray and Vohra (1997) and Koczy (2003). The second line of research
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1concerns non-cooperative implementation of the core for characteristic function
form games. Important contributions to this literature include Kalai, Postle-
waite and Roberts (1979), Chatterjee et. al. (1993), Moldovanu and Winter
(1994, 1995), and Serrano and Vohra (1997). Non-cooperative games of coali-
tion formation in the presence of externalities have been studied by Bloch (1995),
Yi (1997), and Ray and Vohra (1997).
In non-cooperative games of coalition formation, the set of equilibrium pay-
oﬀs often depends on the ﬁne details of the bargaining protocol. Changing the
order in which players make and accept proposals may change the distribution
of bargaining power. This happens, for example, in the very natural game of
Chatterjee et. al. (1993). To address this problem, Moldovanu and Winter
(1995) look at outcomes that are equilibrium outcomes for any order of moves.
This approach is interesting, but diﬀers from the usual concept of implementa-
tion. Serrano and Vohra (1997) implement the core correspondence in economic
environments using a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, each player proposes
an outcome. In the second stage, a player may propose a coalition, which forms
if all members accept. It is not clear how to generalize this game to the general
partition function form games studied in our paper. At the very least, more
stages would have to be added in order to address the key issue of how outsiders
react when a coalition is formed.
Perry and Reny (1994) introduce a continuous-time game with no ﬁxed pro-
tocol for making oﬀers. Their game seems to capture the spirit of free compe-
tition underlying the core. The outcome does not depend on some arbitrarily
speciﬁed order of moves. In their original paper, Perry and Reny did not allow
externalities across coalitions. However, in their game outsiders can react to the
formation of a coalition, so it seems well suited to handle externalities. After
a coalition has “left” the Perry and Reny game, the remaining players enter a
subgame which has the same structure as the original game. Since the original
game implements the core, the subgame naturally implements the core of the
“reduced game” consisting of the players who did not leave. Accordingly, when
the original players leave, they will expect that the remaining players behave in
2a way which is consistent with the core of the reduced game. The self-similar
structure of the Perry and Reny game suggests a connection with the recur-
sive core (brieﬂy, r-core). The recursive core is a solution concept for partition
function form games, where the worth of a coalition is calculated by recursively
computing the cores of the “reduced societies.” The connection between the re-
cursive core and Perry and Reny’s game when there are only three players was
pointed out by Huang and Sjöström (2003). The current paper shows that Perry
and Reny’s game, suitably modiﬁed to allow for externalities across coalitions,
provides a non-cooperative implementation of the r-core, with any number of
players. Perry and Reny’s game needs to be modiﬁed mainly because, in the
presence of externalities, bargaining cannot be directly over payoﬀs. In our
game, players instead bargain over sharing rules. We believe these result sheds
some light on how to deﬁne the core based on partition functions. Speciﬁcally,
it suggests that the r-core is a natural generalization of the core to games with
externalities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the deﬁnition
of the r-core. Section 3 provides an example which illuminates the issues that
arise when the core is extended to allow for externalities. Section 4 describes
the modiﬁed Perry and Reny (1994) game. We prove our two main theorems in
the Section 5. Section 6 discusses the assumption of total r-balancedness.
2 The recursive core
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the set of players. A coalition is a non-empty subset
of N. A coalition structure is a partition of N. A transferable utility game in
partition function form is denoted <N ,P> ,w h e r eP is the partition function.
The partition function form is the natural way to model externalities across
coalitions. For any coalition structure PN and for any coalition S in PN, P(S |
PN) > 0 is the value (or worth) of S when players partition themselves according
3to PN.1 Thus, the worth of S can depend on the coalitional structure formed
by the players in N\S. For any payoﬀ vector x ≡ (xi)i∈N and any coalition
S ⊆ N, let x(S) ≡
P
i∈S xi. Ap a y o ﬀ vector x ∈ Rn is feasible under the
partition PN if for every coalition S in PN, x(S)=P(S |P N).I fS ∈ PN, then
we have PN =( S,A1,A 2,...,Ak) for some coalitions A1,A 2,...,Ak. Notice that
PN\S ≡ (A1,A 2,...,Ak) is a partition of N\S. With a slight abuse of notation,
we write PN =( S,PN\S) and P(S | S,PN\S) ≡ P(S |P N).
Now we can deﬁne the recursive core (r-core). Consider any coalition S ⊆ N,
and suppose the players in N\S have partitioned themselves into PN\S.T h e
r-core for coalition S given PN\S,d e n o t e dC(S | S,PN\S),i sd e ﬁned as follows.
For a single-player society S = {i},w ed e ﬁne C({i}|{ i},PN\{i}) to be the set
of payoﬀ vectors feasible under ({i},PN\{i}). Proceeding recursively, suppose
t h er - c o r eh a sb e e nd e ﬁned for all coalitions with at least s−1 members, and all
partitions on players other than these s−1 members. Now suppose coalition S
has s members, and other players partition themselves according to PN\S.F o r
any coalition T ⊆ S,d e ﬁne




P(S | S,PN\S) if T = S
min{x(T):x ∈ C(S\T | S\T,T,PN\S)} if T 6= S
Now, x ∈ C(S | S,PN\S) if and only if there exists some partition PS of S such
that x is feasible under the partition (PS,PN\S),a n dx(T) ≥ V (T | S,PN\S)
for each coalition T ⊆ S. This completes the deﬁnition.
T h er - c o r ep r e d i c t sh o wS will partition itself given that N\S is partitioned
according to PN\S, but the prediction may not be unique. Let P(S | S,PN\S)
denote the set of all r-core partitions of S given PN\S.T h a t i s , PS ∈ P(S |
S,PN\S) if and only if there is x ∈ C(S | S,PN\S) which is feasible under the
partition (PS,PN\S). We will show below that if <N ,P>is strictly superad-
ditive, then the r-core makes the unique prediction that S stays together, i.e.,
P(S | S,PN\S) contains only (S).
1Allowing P(S |P N) ≤ 0 would not change the results, but it would make the exposition
slightly more awkward.
4The ﬁnal step of the recursive deﬁnition occurs when S = N. Although the
method is the same in each step, it is useful to simplify the notation at the last
step. At the last step the worth of T ⊆ N will be denoted V (T) instead of
V (T | N). Similarly, we write C(N) instead of C(N | N), and P(N) instead of
P(N | N). By a slight abuse of terminology, we refer to C(N) as the r-core of
<N ,P> .N o t i c et h a tx ∈ C(N) if and only if there is some partition PN of
N such that x is feasible under the partition PN, and x(T) ≥ V (T) for each
coalition T ⊆ N. This simpliﬁed notation should not cause any confusion.
Intuitively, the recursive core may be justiﬁed as follows. In a stable outcome,
each coalition must get at least “what it is worth.” However, in partition function
form games the payoﬀ to coalition T ⊆ N depends on the behavior of the players
in N\T. Therefore, in order to give coalition T “what it is worth,” we must
p r e d i c tw h a tt h ep l a y e r si nN\T will do if the coalition T forms. The α-core
applies maximal pessimism: the players in T think that what is worst for them
will happen, regardless of the incentives of the members of N\T to hurt the
players in T. The idea behind the recursive core is instead that the players in T
think the players in N\T will apply the solution concept to their own “reduced
game”. Thus, if coalition T forms, every subcoalition of N\T will insist on
getting “what it is worth,” rather than trying to punish the members of T. The
set of payoﬀ vectors that can occur when the players in N\T behave according
to the solution concept is C(N\T | N\T,T). Accordingly, we deﬁne the worth
of coalition T to be V (T) ≡ min{x(T):x ∈ C(N\T | N\T,T)},a n dx is in the
r-core of <N , P>if and only if x(T) ≥ V (T) for all T ⊆ N. This recursive
logic is less pessimistic than the α-core logic and accordingly computes a higher
worth for any coalition. Thus, the r-core is always a subset of the α-core.
Each characteristic function form corresponds to a “trivial” partition func-
tion form, where the payoﬀ to any coalition S is independent of the behavior of
the players in N\S. If the characteristic function form game is totally balanced,
then the r-core for the corresponding partition function form game is non-empty
and equals the α-core, and also the core of the original characteristic function
5form game (because there is only one possible way to deﬁne the worth of a coali-
tion). If the characteristic function form game is not totally balanced, then the
r-core may be empty, because the recursive construction requires all subgames
to have non-empty cores. In the Perry and Reny game, this corresponds to
the requirement of subgame perfection (i.e., an equilibrium must exist in every
subgame).
Peleg (1986) and Tadenuma (1992) characterize the core for characteristic
function form games using a consistency axiom. In their deﬁnition of “reduced
game,” a set of “remaining players” may cooperate with a set of “leaving play-
ers.” With externalities, we need to specify the behavior of those “remaining
players” who are not cooperating. It seems natural to assume that they parti-
tion themselves according to the solution concept. We leave for future work a
characterization of the r-core along these lines.
Just like classical cooperative game theory, we assume agreements are fully
binding. To avoid any misunderstanding, suppose contracts are legally binding
and will be enforced by a court of law. Since a coalition can form under a legally
binding contract, they need not worry about destabilizing deviations within the
coalition. Therefore, a coalition can always insist on getting at least “what it is
worth.”
The r-core is non-empty if and only if C(N) is a non-empty set. Of course,
it is easy to construct examples where the r-core is not non-empty. Even if the
r-core is non-empty, the grand coalition may not form. Consider the following
example. Let N = {1,2}. The grand coalition is worth V (N) ≡ P(N | N)=1 .
Each player i ∈ {1,2} on his own is worth 2, i.e., V ({i})=P({i}|{ 1},{2})=2 .
T h er - c o r ei sas i n g l e t o n ,C(N)=( 2 ,2), and the r-core partition structure for
N is P(N)=( {1},{2}). Here the grand coalition breaks apart by mutual
agreement. This type of situation will complicate the non-cooperative imple-
mentation of the r-core. To simplify the analysis, we would like to be assured
that each coalition S prefers to stick together rather than break apart, i.e.,
P(S | S,PN\S)=( S). Thus, we introduce the following deﬁnition.
6Deﬁnition 1 The game <N ,P>is totally r-balanced if and only if for any S
and PN\S, P(S | S,PN\S)=( S).
We will discuss this assumption in Section 6. This property is not easy to
check as it stands. However, it turns out that strictly superadditive games are
totally r-balanced, provided the r-core is non-empty. Formally, <N , P>is
strictly superadditive if for any two disjoint coalitions S and T and any coali-
tional structure PN\(S∪T) on the remaining players,
P(S | S,T,PN\(S∪T))+P(T | S,T,PN\(S∪T)) <P(S ∪ T | S ∪ T,PN\(S∪T)).
(1)
For example, symmetric Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated commodities
(Deneckere and Davidson (1985)) satisﬁes (1). In strictly superadditive games,
a coalition will maximize its joint payoﬀ by staying together.
Proposition 1. If the game <N , P>is strictly superadditive and the
r-core is non-empty, then <N ,P>is totally r-balanced.
Proof. By deﬁnition, V (S | S,PN\S)=P(S | S,PN\S).S t r i c t s u p e r -
additivity implies that if S breaks up into several coalitions, the sum of the
payoﬀs of the members of S will be strictly lower than P(S | S,PN\S).B u ti f
x ∈ C(S | S,PN\S) then x(S) ≥ V (S | S,PN\S), which implies that S must
stay together. QED
3 A three-player example
We illustrate some aspects of the recursive core and its implementation in a





P(N | N)=1 .
7To calculate his own worth, player i must predict what players j and k
would do if player i “leaves the game”, i.e., refuses to cooperate with j and
k.I fp l a y e r sj and k form a coalition, the resulting structure is ({i},{j,k}), in
which case players j and k share b while player i gets a.I fp l a y e r sj and k break
apart and induce ({i},{j},{k}), all three players receive zero. A reasonable
prediction is that players j and k will stick together if b>0, but break apart
if b<0. This is indeed what will happen in subgame perfect equilibrium of the
Perry and Reny game. Accordingly, if player i “leaves the game” as a singleton
coalition, he expects to earn V ({i})=0if b<0 and V ({i})=a if b>0.2 If a
two-player coalition {j,k} “leaves the game,” the resulting coalition structure is
({i},{j,k}),s oV ({j,k})=b. Perry and Reny’s game does not allow any more
moves by players j and k after they have “left,” so coalition {j,k} cannot break
apart and it must get b. (The intuitive justiﬁcation is that agreements to form
a coalition are legally binding). Finally, V (N)=1 .
There are three cases.
Case 1. If b<0 then the recursive core C(N) consists of all payoﬀ vectors
such that x1+x2+x3 =1and xi ≥ 0 for all i. Notice that C(N) 6= ∅. We predict
that the grand coalition forms even if a+b>1. The structure ({i},{j,k}) is not
a possible r-core structure when b<0 because under this structure, feasibility
implies that players j and k get b in sum. At least one of them would get
strictly less than the worth of a singleton coalition (zero), which is not possible.
In the Perry and Reny game, a player would rather leave on his own than take
a negative payoﬀ.
Case 2. If b>0 and a+b<1,t h e nC(N) consists of all payoﬀ vectors such
that x1 +x2 +x3 =1 , xi ≥ a for all i, and xi +xj ≥ b for all i,j distinct. This
implies that C(N) 6= ∅ as long as a ≤ 1/3 and b ≤ 2/3.I fC(N) 6= ∅ then the
prediction is that the grand coalition forms.
Case 3. If b>0 and a+b>1,t h e nC(N) consists of all payoﬀ vectors such
that xi ≥ a for all i, xi + xj ≥ b for all i,j distinct, and there is i such that
xi = a and xj + xk = b for j,k distinct and diﬀerent from i. This implies that
2If b =0 , then player i is assumed to have pessimistic expectations, V ({i})=m i n {0,a}.
8C(N) 6= ∅ only if a = b/2, in which case two players will form a coalition and
share b, leaving the third player to stand alone and get a.
These r-core predictions seem intuitively plausible. In contrast, according
to the α-core logic, player i must fear that if he refuses to cooperate, the other
two players will induce whatever coalition structure is the worst for player i.
Therefore, player i is worth only min{0,a}, regardless of b. However, these fears
may be unfounded. If a<0 and b<0,w h yw o u l dp l a y e r sj and k form a
coalition just to hurt player i?I f a>0 and b>0, why would players j and
k break up just to hurt player i? The recursive core rules out such incredible
threats.
An important aspect of Perry and Reny’s game is that it does not specify a
ﬁxed order of moves. If a>0 and b>0, then each player will insist on at least
a, because he thinks that he can leave, and then the other two will react by
forming a coalition. On the other hand, suppose there is an exogenously given
order of moves (say 1,2,3), as assumed for example by Maskin (2003). Then the
following might be an equilibrium if a is large: player 1 starts by leaving, then
players 2 and 3 merge. Even if player j ∈ {2,3} gets less than a, when he moves
player 1 has already left, and so player j m a yb eu n a b l et og e ta. In contrast,
in the Perry and Reny game, player j ∈ {2,3} can always preempt player 1 by
leaving ﬁrst. A ﬁxed order of moves would yield predictions even in cases when
the r-core is empty; however, it would not capture the spirit of free competition
underlying the core.
Ar e ﬁnement of the α-core could be obtained by recursively deﬁning stable
coalition structures, starting at the ﬁnest and building toward coarser struc-
tures.3 Suppose we postulate that ({i},{j},{k}) is always a stable partition,
and then deﬁne ({i},{j,k}) to be stable if and only if players j,k prefer to stay
together rather than induce ({i},{j},{k}). Suppose, ﬁnally, we postulate that
if player i defects from the grand coalition, he fears the worst of all stable par-
titions. This reﬁned α-core seems more compelling than the original α-core. If
a<0 and b<0, it would yield the “correct” prediction that player i on his own
3This discussion was prompted by the comments of a referee.
9is worth 0. However, suppose a>0 and b>0. A c c o r d i n gt ot h er e ﬁned α-core
logic, player i fears that by defecting from the grand coalition, he may trigger
the stable structure ({i},{j},{k}) and get zero. Here he is too pessimistic, be-
cause if player i leaves then players j and k actually prefer to form a coalition
(and this is what they will do in any equilibrium of the Perry and Reny game).
In general, if we start by postulating that the ﬁnest coalition structure is always
stable, and then recursively deﬁne stability for coarser structures, and ﬁnally
postulate that a deviator fears the worst of all stable coalition structures, then a
deviator may fear structures that are “too ﬁne” to be truly credible. The reﬁned
α-core would be biased in favor of “splitting up” with not enough “re-merging.”
It would not correspond to equilibria of the Perry and Reny game, because that
game has no such bias: players j and k will not fall apart if they prefer to merge.
We end this section by considering the question of internal instability of
coalitions. Although the Perry and Reny game rules it out by assumption, one
can imagine scenarios where a coalition falls apart after it has “left.” There are
in fact two separate issues. First, if (contrary to our assumption) legally binding
contracts cannot be signed, then a coalition member may worry about other
members leaving the coalition, thereby hurting him. The fear of such defections
may prevent the coalition from forming in the ﬁrst place. Second, even if legally
binding contracts can be signed, one can imagine coalitions breaking apart by
mutual agreement if this is beneﬁcial to all its members. A judge may be
unwilling to stop the break-up of a coalition if its members unanimously agree
to “tear up the contract.” 4 We address these issues in turn.
To be speciﬁc, suppose 0 <b≤ (1 − a)/2 and a<0 (which is case 2
above). Consider the payoﬀ vector x where a ≤ x1 < 0, b ≤ x2 <b− x1,a n d
x3 =1− x1 − x2 ≥ b. Such x exists (for instance, take x =( a,b,1 − a − b)).
Since x1 +x2 <b ,we have x/ ∈ C(N). If legally binding contracts are available,
then x will be rejected by players 1 and 2, because they can sign a binding
agreement which guarantees themselves b. However, suppose the players cannot
4Of course, there are many real-world situations where even unanimous consent is not
enough to break a coalition. An example would be certain laws of marriage.
10sign binding agreements. Player 1 certainly cannot improve on x on his own,
because if he refuses to cooperate, then players 2 and 3 will form a coalition
and share b>0, a n dp l a y e r1w o u l do n l yg e ta ≤ x1. Suppose instead player 1
proposes to form coalition {1,2}, and he oﬀers x2 + ε to player 2, where ε>0.
Player 1 would get b−(x2+ε) < 0. For ε small enough, b−(x2+ε) >x 1 so both
players 1 and 2 would be better oﬀ forming coalition {1,2} than accepting x.
However, without a binding contract, player 2 may suspect that player 1 plans
to break up {1,2} and induce the ﬁnest coalition structure ({1},{2},{3}).T h i s
would give each player zero, which is better for player 1 than staying in coalition
{1,2} (since b−(x2+ε) < 0). Fearing this internal instability of {1,2},p l a y e r2
may reject player 1’s proposal, preferring to get x2 > 0.T h u s ,x may be viable
if binding contracts are not available.5 In fact, x is an Equilibrium Binding
Agreement for the grand coalition (Ray and Vohra (1997)).6 By allowing legally
binding contracts, we avoid these issues.
Now consider the issue of break-up by mutual agreement. Suppose b<0,
and suppose a two-player coalition {i,j} forms, sharing b equally. If instead they
manage to break apart and induce ({1},{2},{3}), they are both made better





Thus, if b<0 then two-player coalitions are not credible. One might argue
that it is not realistic to assume that non-credible coalitions stick together.
5A potential problem with this argument is the hypothesis that player 1 can induce the
ﬁnest coalition structure ({1},{2},{3}) by defecting from {1,2}.R e c a l lt h a tp l a y e r1c a n n o t
block x on his own, because he fears that the other two players will merge. But then, why
does he think he can induce ({1},{2},{3}) by defecting from {1,2}?T h ea r g u m e n ts e e m st o
put too much emphasis on the breaking apart of coalitions and too little on the possibility of
re-merging.
6No internally stable EBA for the coalition {1,2} can block x,s i n c ex2 ≥ b. More generally,
if 0 <b≤ 1−a
2 and a<0, then payoﬀ vector x is an EBA for the grand coalition if xi ≥ a for
each i ∈ N, x1 + x2 + x3 =1and either there are at least two distinct players j,k ∈ N such
that xj,x k ≥ b, or xi + xj ≥ b for all distinct i,j ∈ N.
11However, this problem is moot, because if a coalition is not credible, then the
corresponding core constraint is anyway redundant (see Ray (1989)). Notice
that if b<0,t h e nxi ≥ 0 for all i implies that xj + xk ≥ b for all j,k distinct.
Suppose we modify the example by setting
P({1}|({i},{j},{k})) = P({2}|({i},{j},{k})) = c>0
Otherwise, the partition function is as before. Suppose a<0,c<b<2c,
and a + b<1. Now b>cimplies that if player i ∈ {1,2} leaves, then the
other two will form a coalition. Therefore, V ({i})=P({i}|({i},{j,k})) = a
for i ∈ {1,2}. But b<2c means that if player 3 leaves, the other two will
split up. Therefore, V ({3})=P({3}|({i},{j},{k})) = 0. For any two-player
coalition, V ({j,k})=b, and V (N)=1 . Thus, the recursive core C(N) consists
of all payoﬀ vectors such that x1 + x2 + x3 =1 ,x 1 ≥ a, x2 ≥ a, x3 ≥ 0
and xi + xj ≥ b for all i,j ∈ N distinct. Intuitively, one might argue as above
that perhaps {1,2} is unlikely to stick together, because if they split up and
induce ({1},{2},{3}),t h e yg e tc>b / 2 each. However, they cannot be assured
that ({1},{2},{3}) would be the ﬁnal outcome. Each player i ∈ {1,2} fears
that if he stands alone the other two will merge. Coalition {1,2} is credible
in the sense that V ({1,2})=b>2a = V ({1})+V ({2}). Accordingly, it is
not unrealistic to assume that {1,2} sticks together. The recursive method
computes the value of a coalition based on the whole strategic situation, it does
not automatically declare the ﬁnest partition stable.
4 The non-cooperative game
We will show that a modiﬁed Perry and Reny (1994) extensive form game yields
a natural non-cooperative implementation of the r-core. The modiﬁcation is
required in order to allow for externalities across coalitions. First, we will in-
formally describe the non-cooperative game, following Section 2 of Perry and
Reny (1994).
124.1 Informal description
The game starts at t =0and time is continuous. At any point in time, a player
can either: 1) make a proposal; 2) accept the current proposal; 3) stay quiet
or 4) leave.7 Ap r o p o s a l((wi)i∈S,S) by any player who hasn’t left consists of
a division rule (wi)i∈S and a coalition S.H e r e wi ∈ R+ represents i’s share
of the worth of S.W e r e q u i r e
P
i∈S wi =1and wi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S.I n
Perry and Reny (1994), a player proposes a payoﬀ vector,b u tt h i sw o n ’ tw o r k
here because the members of S don’t know what payoﬀs are feasible until all
other coalitions have formed. (In a partition function form game the coalitional
structure determines the value of S.) A division rule does work, because it
implies a feasible distribution of payoﬀsw i t h i nS for every possible coalitional
structure that might form.8
When a proposal is made, it is eﬀective as long as no new proposal is made.
Once a new proposal is made, the previous proposal is no longer eﬀective. To
avoid the simultaneous proposals of distinct proposals, when this happens it is
ruled that no new proposal is eﬀective. So there is at most one eﬀective proposal
at any point in time.
If an eﬀective proposal ((wi)i∈S,S) is accepted by all members in S, then the
proposal becomes binding,a n dS is a binding coalition. If any player in binding
coalition S chooses to leave, then all players in S must leave at the same time.
At any point in time, there might be several binding proposals among the players
who haven’t left. If a new proposal contains any player in any binding coalition,
then it must contain all players in that binding coalition. This reﬂects the idea
that annulment of a binding agreement has to be approved by every member
in it. To avoid the problem where a player is involved in two diﬀerent binding
coalitions, if a new proposal ((wi)i∈S,S) becomes binding, then any old binding
proposal that involves members of S is annulled. Hence, at any point in time, all
7At the very beginning of the game when t =0 , players can only choose either 1) or 3).
8We could generalize to allow a proposal pertaining to a coalition S to specify a complete
contingent plan regarding how to divide S’s value under all possible coalitional structures
N\S may form. Allowing this does not change the result of the paper.
13binding coalitions are disjoint. Players consume only after all have left. Notice
that when all players leave, the coalitional structure is uniquely deﬁned. Thus,
the partition function implies a well-deﬁned payoﬀ for each coalition. Players
share the payoﬀ of the coalition to which they belong according to the binding
proposals they have signed.
We now more formally deﬁne the rules and the equilibrium concept. Again,
the description closely follows Perry and Reny (1994).
4.2 Histories
Ap r o p o s a ls p e c i ﬁes a division rule (wi)i∈S and a coalition S.T h u s ,t h es e to f
feasible proposals is
P ≡ {((wi)i∈S,S):S ⊆ N,
X
i∈S wi =1and wi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S}.
Denote by a the choice to accept the current eﬀective proposal, q the choice
to be quiet and l t h ec h o i c et ol e a v e .Ah i s t o r yf o rp l a y e ri up to time t>0 is
a function hi such that
hi :[ 0 ,t) → P ∪ {a,q,l}.
If hi is a history for player i up to time t, and t0 <t ,then let hi|t0 denote
the history for player i up to time t0 which is implied by hi (i.e., hi|t0 is the
truncation of hi at time t0).
Since players can only leave once and for all, h
−1
i (l) is either empty or a
singleton. We follow Perry and Reny (1994) by assuming that h
−1
i (P ∪ {a}) is
a ﬁnite set. At t =0 , since nothing has happened, hi(0) = ∅. For convenience,
denote a history up to time t by the n-tuple of functions h ≡ (h1,h 2,...,hn).
For t0 <t ,let h|t0 denote the truncation of h at t0. Let H(t) denote the set of
all histories up to time t and H ≡∪ ∞
t=0H(t) the set of all histories.
Let p(h) denote the current eﬀective proposal according to h.T o m a k e
it well-deﬁned, if according to h, either no proposal has been made, multiple
distinct proposals are simultaneously made, the current eﬀective proposal has
14become binding or some member in a binding coalition which is involved in the
current eﬀective proposal has exercised to leave, then p(h)=∅.9
Let τ(h) for h ∈ H(t) denote the amount of time that has passed up to time
t since p(h) was proposed. Whenever p(h)=∅, τ(h) measures the time that
has passed since the previous eﬀective proposal becomes binding. When there
is never any eﬀective proposal, τ(h) measures the time that has passed since
time 0.
Let N(h) ⊆ N denote the set of players who have not left and A(h) ⊆ N(h)
the set of players who have accepted p(h). Whenever p(h)=∅, A(h)=∅.
Player i is said to have accepted the current eﬀective proposal p(h) for h ∈
H(t) if p(h) is made at time t<tand hi(t0)=a for some t0 ∈ (t,t).I fe v e r y o n e
involved in p(h) has accepted it, then p(h) is binding. The coalitions in binding
proposals are called binding coalitions.
Let Π(h) denote the set of binding proposals among the players in N(h).
Since there are externalities across coalitions, we also need to keep track of
those binding coalitions that have left. Let K(h) denote the coalitional structure
formed by those players that have left, i.e., N\N(h), according to h. Perry and
Reny (1994) do not keep track of K(h) since for characteristic function form
games the remaining players’ values are not aﬀected by the coalitional structure
of the players who left. In our setting, the coalitional structure of the players
who left does aﬀect the values of the remaining players.
9When some member in a binding coalition which is involved in the current eﬀective pro-
posal has exercised to leave, we need to reset p(h) to an empty set to avoid the following from
happening. Suppose players 1, 2 and 3 remain and the current proposal pertains to them.
Suppose player 1 and 2 have accepted the current proposal and 3 hasn’t. Suppose coalition
{3} is binding. If 3 exercises to leave, then by the rules in Perry and Reny, if p(h) is not reset
t oa ne m p t ys e t ,p l a y e r s1a n d2c a n n o td oa n y t h i n gf u r t h e ra n dt h e yh a v et os t a yi nt h e
game forever.
154.3 Payoﬀs
If a proposal ((wi)i∈S,S) becomes binding and player i ∈ S leaves, then in
contrast to Perry and Reny (1994) he cannot consume immediately (because the
worth of S depends on the ﬁnal coalitional structure PN). All he can guarantee
himself by leaving is that coalition S will be part of the ﬁnal coalitional structure.
When all players have left, so that N(h)=∅,as t r u c t u r ePN of binding coalitions
has formed. Every coalition in PN distributes its value according to its binding
division rule. Thus, if S ∈ PN and its division rule is (wi)i∈S,t h e np l a y e ri ∈ S
gets wiP(S |P N). If there is a player who never leaves the game, then every
player i ∈ N gets −∞.10
4.4 Strategies
A strategy for any player is a function which maps every possible history to an
action. Hence, a strategy for any player i ∈ N,d e n o t e db yfi is:
fi : H → P ∪ {a,q,l}.
Denote the n-tuple of strategies by f ≡ (f1,f 2,...,fn). We impose several re-
strictions on the strategies.
(S0) For h ∈ H(0), fi(h) ∈ P ∪ {q}. That is, at the very beginning of the
game, players can only make a proposal or be quiet.
(S1) If i ∈ N(h) has accepted the current eﬀective proposal p(h),t h e nfi(h)=
q. That is, before the current eﬀective proposal becomes binding, an
accepting player can only be quiet. If i ∈ N\N(h),t h e nfi(h)=q.T h u s ,
a leaving player can only be quiet.
10One can relax this rather strong assumption. For instance, if some binding coalitions have
left while others remain in the game forever, it might be argued that although the remaining
p l a y e r sm i g h tg e tt h ew o r s tp o s s i b l ep a y o ﬀs, any leaving coalition should at least get its value
in the coalitional structure where all the leaving coalitions have formed and the remaining
players form into the worst possible coalitional structure for this coalition in consideration.
Allowing this does not change the result.
16(S2) If fi(h)=( ( wi)i∈S0,S0), then for any binding coalition S,e i t h e rS∩S0 = ∅
or S ⊆ S0.M o r e o v e r , S0 ⊆ N(h). That is, if a new proposal contains
some players in a binding coalition, it has to include all of them. Any new
proposal can only contain players who haven’t left.
(S3) If a player i is not a member of any binding coalition, then fi(h) 6= l.
That is, a player can only leave if he belongs to a binding coalition.
(S4) For all i and all t>0 and for all h ∈ H(t) and t ∈ [0,t),t h e r ee x i s t sa n
ε>0 such that fi(h|τ)=q for all τ ≥ 0 and τ ∈ (t − ε,t + ε)\{t}.T h a t
is, there are two open intervals (t − ε,t) and (t,t + ε) in which player i is
quiet. This assumption makes sure that players always have enough time
to respond.11
Lastly, denote player i’s payoﬀ induced by the strategy tuple f after h by
ui(f|h).L e tFi denote the set of strategies for i which satisfy (S0) to (S4).
4.5 Equilibrium concept
The equilibrium concept is stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE).
By deﬁnition, a strategy proﬁle b f ≡ (b f1, b f2,...,c fn) is an SSPNE if (E1) and (E2)
are satisﬁed:
(E1) Perfection: For all i ∈ N, h ∈ H and fi ∈ Fi,
ui(b f|h) ≥ ui((f1, b f2,...,c fn)|h).
(E2) Stationarity: For h,h0 ∈ H,i f
(p(h),τ(h),N(h),A(h),Π(h),K(h)) = (p(h0),τ(h0),N(h0),A(h0),Π(h0),K(h0)),
then b f(h)=b f(h0).
Notice that we have one more state variable K(h) than Perry and Reny
because of externalities across coalitions.
11See Example 1 and the last paragraph on page 806 in Perry and Reny (1994) for a
discussion of this assumption.
175R e s u l t s
We will prove two theorems, corresponding to Theorems 1 and 2 in Perry and
Reny (1994). The ﬁrst theorem states that every SSPNE outcome of the exten-
sive form game is in the r-core of the partition function game <N ,P> .T h e
second theorem needs some qualiﬁcation. We will show that for any totally r-
balanced game <N ,P> , every r-core outcome can be supported as an SSPNE
outcome of the extensive form game.
The proof of Theorem 1 is more complicated than the corresponding proof in
Perry and Reny (1994). This is because in our model the value of a coalition is
not given by a characteristic function, but instead has to be derived recursively
from the partition function. Thus, we ﬁrst need to show that if there exists
an SSPNE of the extensive form game, then the value of each coalition is well
deﬁned. After having done this, we show the existence of an r-core outcome
which corresponds to this SSPNE outcome.
The following proposition is used to prove Theorem 1.
Proposition 2. Suppose an SSPNE b f exists. Take any S ⊆ N and any
partition PN\S on N\S. Let x denote the subgame equilibrium outcome induced
by b f where players in N\S have left according to PN\S, i.e. in the subgame
where the states are (p(h),τ(h),N(h),A(h),Π(h),K(h)) = (∅,0,S,∅,∅,PN\S).
The following is true:
(a) C(S | S,PN\S) 6= ∅.
(b) There must exist a y ∈ C(S | S,PN\S) such that xi = yi for all i ∈ S.
(c) The coalitional structure induced by b f must be (PS,PN\S) where PS ∈
P(S | S,PN\S).
Proof. We will proceed by induction.
Suppose |S| =1 . For any S = {i} and any PN\{i} on N\{i}, C({i}|
{i},PN\{i}) 6= ∅ since by deﬁnition, it consists of every payoﬀ vector where i gets
P({i}|{ i},PN\{i}) and every coalition S0 ∈ PN\{i} gets P(S0 |{ i},PN\{i}).
18In the subgame where all players in N\{i} have left and formed the coali-
tional structure PN\{i},p l a y e ri must ﬁrst propose ((1),{i}) a n dt h e nl e a v e
according to b fi. For otherwise, i is staying in the game forever and getting −∞,
which cannot be an equilibrium strategy. Parts (b) and (c) follow immediately.
Thus, we have established that parts (a), (b) and (c) hold for any S such
that |S| =1and any partition PN\S on N\S.
To continue the induction, suppose that for any S such that |S| ≤ k−1 <n
and any partition PN\S on N\S, parts (a), (b) and (c) hold.
Suppose |S| = k. For any partition PN\S on N\S, to show part (a), we
ﬁrst need to make sure that V (T | S,PN\S) is well deﬁned for all T ⊆ S.B y
deﬁnition, V (S | S,PN\S)=P(S | S,PN\S).A n d V (T | S,PN\S) is also
well deﬁned because C(S\T | S\T,T,PN\S) 6= ∅ by the induction hypothesis
(because |S\T| ≤ k − 1).
Suppose by contradiction that C(S | S,PN\S)=∅.A t t i m e t,l e th be
any history such that (p(h),τ(h),N(h),A(h),Π(h),K(h)) = (∅,0,S,∅,∅,PN\S).
Consider the continuation equilibrium outcome x induced by b f.S i n c e C(S |
S,PN\S)=∅, there must exist a coalition S0 ⊆ S such that x(S0) <V (S0 |
S,PN\S). Without loss of generality, suppose S0 = {1,2,...,s 0} where s0 = |S0|.
Let
yi = xi +
V (S0 | S,PN\S) − x(S0)
|S0|




V (S0 | S,PN\S)
for all i ∈ S0.
Consider any time t0 >t ,a n yh i s t o r yh0 ∈ H(t0) such that h0|t = h and i)
p(h0)=( ( wi)i∈S0,S0), ii) N(h0)=S,i i i )A(h0)={1,2,...,s 0 −1},i v )Π(h0)=∅,
v) K(h0)=PN\S, and vi) b fi(h0)=q for all i ∈ N.T h u s ,a t t i m et0 player s0
is the only member of S0 = {1,...,s0} who has not yet accepted the proposal
((wi)i∈S0,S0).
Claim: According to b f,p l a y e rs0 will accept ((wi)i∈S0,S0) before any new
proposal is made and thus ((wi)i∈S0,S0) will become binding.
19P r o o fo fc l a i m .A feasible action for player s0 is to accept the current eﬀective
proposal ((wi)i∈S0,S0) and leave before anything happens. In this case the
whole coalition S0 leaves by the rules of the game. The resulting coalitional
structure will be (PS\S0,S0,PN\S) for some r-core coalitional structure PS\S0 ∈
P(S\S0 | S\S0,S0,PN\S), according to the induction hypothesis. When S0
is calculating its value V (S0 | S,PN\S),i te x p e c t st h ew o r s tp o s s i b l er - c o r e
coalitional structure and PS\S0 is not necessarily the worst possible one, so
V (S0 | S,PN\S) ≤ P(S0 |P S\S0,S0,PN\S),
(If S0 = S,t h e nV (S0 | S,PN\S)=P(S0 | S0,PN\S)). Player s0 gets
ws0P(S0 |P S\S0,S0,PN\S) ≥ ys0 >x s0.
Suppose, according to b f,p l a y e rs0 never accepts any proposal ever. Then
player s0 gets −∞, which contradicts the assumption that ˆ f is an SSPNE, since
we have just shown that by accepting and leaving he can do better. Suppose
instead that, according to b f, some new proposal ((wi)i∈S00,S00) is made before
player s0 accepts ((wi)i∈S0,S0). In the continuation equilibrium, s0 must get at
least ws0P(S0 |P S\S0,S0,PN\S) >x s0 (we have shown that he has a feasible
action which gives him ws0P(S0 |P S\S0,S0,PN\S)). By stationarity, this means
whenever any history h0 yields the states
(p(h0),τ(h0),N(h0),A(h0),Π(h0),K(h0)) = (((wi)i∈S00,S00),0,S,∅,∅,PN\S),
player s0 gets strictly more than xs0. But then player s0 could have proposed
((wi)i∈S00,S00) at time close enough to t. This is in contradiction to x being
a continuation equilibrium outcome. Hence according to b f,p l a y e rs0 will ac-
cept ((wi)i∈S0,S0) before any new proposal is made and thus ((wi)i∈S0,S0) will
become binding. This proves the claim.
Next consider at any time t00 >t ,a n yh i s t o r yh00 ∈ H(t00) such that h00|t = h
and i) p(h00)=( ( wi)i∈S0,S0), ii) N(h00)=S, iii) A(h00)={1,2,...,s0 − 2},i v )
Π(h00)=∅,v )K(h00)=PN\S and vi) b fi(h00)=q for all i ∈ N.
20Claim: According to b f,p l a y e r ss0 −1 and s0 will accept ((wi)i∈S0,S0) before
any new proposal is made and ((wi)i∈S0,S0) will become binding.
P r o o fo fc l a i m . The argument is virtually the same as the proof of the
previous claim. A feasible action for player s0 −1 is to accept the proposal, and
if he does, then the previous claim applies so s0 will accept as well. Thus player
s0 − 1 can guarantee himself the payoﬀ of
ws0−1P(S0 |P S\S0,S0,PN\S) ≥ ys0−1 >x s0−1
by accepting and leaving after s0 accepts. As in the previous claim, suppose to
the contrary that either according to ˆ f player s0 −1 never accepts anything, or
a new proposal is made before player s0 − 1 accepts ((wi)i∈S0,S0).I nt h eﬁrst
possibility, player s0 − 1 gets −∞, which is a contradiction of the fact that ˆ f is
an SSPNE. In the second possibility, by an analogous argument, when the new
proposal is made, player s0 −1 must get strictly more than xs0−1. But he could
have made that proposal at time close enough to t.T h i sp r o v e st h ec l a i m .
Proceeding stepwise just as in these two claims, we can ﬁnally establish
the following claim. Let t000 >t , and consider a history h000 ∈ H(t000) such
that h000|t = h, and suppose: i) p(h000)=( ( wi)i∈S0,S0), ii) N(h000)=S, iii)
A(h000)={1},i v )Π(h000)=∅,v )K(h000)=PN\S and vi) b fi(h000)=q for all
i ∈ N. Then, according to b f,p l a y e r s2 to s0 will accept ((wi)i∈S0,S0) before
any new proposal is made and ((wi)i∈S0,S0) will become binding.
However, this claim contradicts the hypothesis that x is a continuation equi-
librium outcome induced by b f, because player 1 can always propose ((wi)i∈S0,S0)
and subsequently accept it at time close enough to t.B yt h i sd e v i a t i o n ,h eg e t s
at least y1 >x 1.T h u sC(S | S,PN\S) 6= ∅ and part (a) is proved.
For part (b), suppose x is the continuation equilibrium outcome induced
by b f where players in N\S have left according to PN\S, i.e., in the subgame
where the states are (p(h),τ(h),N(h),A(h),Π(h),K(h)) = (∅,0,S,∅,∅,PN\S).
If there does not exist a y ∈ C(S | S,PN\S) such that
xi = yi for all i ∈ S,
21then there must exist a coalition S0 ⊆ S such that x(S0) <V(S0 | S,PN\S).B y
the same argument in the proof of part (a), this leads to a contradiction. Part
(c) follows from part (b) immediately. QED
Proposition 2 directly implies the following theorem, which states that every
SSPNE outcome is in the r-core of <N , P> . This is directly analogous to
Theorem 1 in Perry and Reny (1994).
Theorem 1. Suppose an SSPNE b f induces an equilibrium outcome x.
Then x ∈ C(N), and the coalitional structure induced by b f belongs to the r-core
structure P(N).
Now consider the converse of Theorem 1. For any r-core outcome, we need
strategies that support it as an SSPNE. It turns out that strategies similar to
those used by Perry and Reny (1994) in the proof of their Theorem 2 work here
as well. The main modiﬁcation is due to the fact that players must propose
division rules instead of payoﬀ vectors. If we assume total r-balancedness, then
analogues of Lemmas 1 and 2 in Perry and Reny (1994) can be readily proved,
and from this we obtain a converse to Theorem 1.
If the r-core exists, then it exists for any reduced society S given any PN\S.
Thus, for any S ⊂ N and PN\S we can select an r-core payoﬀ vector from
C(S | S,PN\S). In the following, we denote this payoﬀ vector by x(S |P N\S),
where
x(S |P N\S) ∈ C(S | S,PN\S).
For the grand coalition, we choose
x(N |P N\N) ∈ C(N).
Note that when the game is totally r-balanced, for any reduced society S given
any PN\S, P(S | S,PN\S)=( S).
Perry and Reny (1994) construct two continuation equilibrium payoﬀ vec-
tors: one for the continuing equilibrium when the current proposal is rejected,
the other for the continuation equilibrium when the current proposal is accepted.














xj(N(h) | K(h)) if i ∈ Sk for some k ∈ {1,2,...,m}
xi(N(h) | K(h)) if i ∈ N(h)\(S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ Sm).
If the current eﬀective proposal is p(h)=( ( wi)i∈S,S), without loss of generality
we can assume that there exists an integer r such that in the current proposal
p(h), the coalition S contains all the coalitions Sk where k ≤ r.12 On the other
hand, S is disjoint from all the coalitions Sk where k ≥ r +1 . Thus when the
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xj(N(h) | K(h)) if i ∈ Sk where k ∈ {r +1 ,...,m}
xi(N(h) | K(h)) if i ∈ N(h)\(S ∪ Sr+1 ∪ ... ∪ Sm).
By construction, zi(h) will be player i’s payoﬀ in the continuation equilibrium
if the current eﬀective proposal gets rejected, while b zi(h) will be his payoﬀ if it
gets accepted. When p(h)=∅, zi(h)=b zi(h).
The equilibrium strategies are deﬁned as follows. For every t ≥ 0, h ∈ H(t)
and i ∈ N(h),i fτ(h) is not a positive integer then fi(h)=q.I f τ(h) is a
positive integer, then player i behaves as follows:





a if i ∈ S\A(h)
q otherwise
12Recall that if a new proposal contains any player in any binding coalition, then it must
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xl(N(h)|K(h)))j∈N(h),N(h)) if i ∈ N(h)\A(h) and Π(h) 6= {(·,N(h))}
q if i ∈ A(h)
Here Π(h)={(·,N(h))} means that the binding coalition is N(h)13 and
Π(h) 6= {(·,N(h))} means that the binding coalition is not N(h).
These strategies depend only on the state variable. On the equilibrium path,
all players propose ((
xi(N|PN\N) S
j∈N
xj(N|PN\N))i∈N,N) at time 1, accept at time 2, and
leave at time 3. The equilibrium outcome is x(N |P N\N) where every i ∈ N
gets xi(N |P N\N). For any history h where K(h) has left and nothing else has
happened, in the continuing subgame, on the equilibrium path every i ∈ N(h)
gets xi(N(h) | K(h)).
With these strategies, we can easily prove two lemmas analogous to Lemmas
1 and 2 in Perry and Reny (1994). The proof of Lemma 1 shows how total r-
balancedness is used.













13In other words, there exists a division rule (wi)i∈N(h) such that Π(h)=
{((wi)i∈N(h),N(h))}.
14Recall that there exists an integer r such that the current proposal S contains all the
coalitions Sk where k ≤ r and is disjoint from all the coalitions Sk where k ≥ r +1 .























Since x(N(h) | K(h)) belongs to the r-core for N(h) given K(h),
X
j∈Sk
xj(N(h) | K(h)) ≥ V (Sk | N(h),K(h))
= P(Sk | Sk,N(h)\Sk,K(h))
The equality follows because by total r-balancedness, when Sk breaks oﬀ,t h e
remaining players in N(h)\Sk stay together in the r-core. Now x(N(h)\Sk |
Sk,K(h)) belongs to the r-core for N(h)\Sk given (Sk,K(h)), and by total
r-balancedness players in N(h)\Sk stay together. So,
X
j∈Sk





























































wi =1 .Q E D
Lemma 2. Assume total r-balancedness. For any t ≥ 0, h ∈ H(t) and
A(h)=∅, the outcome generated by the strategies f ≡ (f1,...,f n) after h is
such that player i gets zi(h) for all i ∈ N(h).
Proof. Let t1 be the smallest time at least as large as t such that t1 − τ(h)
is an integer. According to the strategies f,i ft 6= t1, then all players are quiet
between [t,t1). Denote the history generated by h1 ∈ H(t1). There are four
possible cases depending on what players will do at t1 a c c o r d i n gt ot h es t r a t e g i e s
f.
Case 1. If fi(h1)=l, then it must be the case that Π(h1)={(·,N(h1))}.
This implies that there exists a division rule (wi)i∈N(h1) such that Π(h1)=
{((wi)i∈N(h1),N(h1))}.T h u sp l a y e ri gets wi
P
j∈N(h1)
xj(N(h1) | K(h1)) for all
i ∈ N(h1) according to f.I ft 6= t1, then since everyone is quiet between [t,t1),









Hence player i gets zi(h).15
15If t = t1 then it is obvious that h = h1 and therefore zi(h)=zi(h1).
26Case 2. If fi(h1)=a for some i ∈ N(h1)\A(h1) and p(h1)=( ( wi)i∈N(h1),N(h1)),
since everyone is quiet between [t,t1) and thus A(h1)=A(h)=∅,t h e ni t
implies b zi(h1) ≥ zi(h1) for all i ∈ N(h1) by the construction of the strate-






b zi(h1), hence b zi(h1)=zi(h1) for all i ∈ N(h1).M o r e -
over, N(h1)=N(h) and zi(h1)=zi(h) for all i ∈ N(h) because everyone is
quiet between [t,t1).
By the equilibrium strategies, everyone is quiet between (t1,t 1 +1 ) .L e t
t2 = t1 +1and denote the history generated by h2 ∈ H(t2). Since everyone
is quiet between (t1,t 2), N(h1)=N(h2) and K(h1)=K(h2).A t t2,s i n c e










Case 3. If fi(h1)=( (
zj(h1) S
l∈N(h1)
xl(N(h1)|K(h1)))j∈N(h1),N(h1)),t h e ne v e r y o n e
is quiet between (t1,t 1 +1 ) .L e tt2 = t1 +1and denote the history generated










The second equality follows because no one leaves between [t1,t 2),s oN(h1)=
N(h2) and K(h1)=K(h2). The third equality follows because no new proposal
binds between [t1,t 2),s ozi(h1)=zi(h2).T h u s a l l p l a y e r s i n N(h1) accept
the proposal at time t2. According to the equilibrium strategies, everyone is
quiet between (t2,t 2 +1 ) .L e tt3 = t2 +1and denote the history generated by
h3 ∈ H(t3). Since no one leaves between [t2,t 3),s oN(h2)=N(h3). Hence all









The ﬁrst equality follows because no one leaves between [t1,t 3) so N(h1)=
N(h3) and K(h1)=K(h3). The second equality follows because nothing hap-
pens between [t,t1).
Case 4. If fi(h1)=a for some i ∈ S\A(h1) and p(h1)=( ( wi)i∈S,S)
where S 6= N(h1), since everyone is quiet between [t,t1) and thus A(h1)=
A(h)=∅, then it implies b zi(h1) ≥ zi(h1) for all i ∈ S by the construction of
the strategies f. So the current proposal becomes binding at t1. By Lemma










i )i∈Sm,Sm)} and without loss
of generality, assume that S contains all the coalitions Sk where k ≤ r and is
disjoint from all the coalitions Sk where k ≥ r+1. Then for all i ∈ N(h1)\(S ∪
Sr+1 ∪ ... ∪ Sm),
b zi(h1)=zi(h1)=xi(N(h1) | K(h1)),






Thus b zi(h1)=zi(h1) for all i ∈ N(h1). Note that all players are quiet between
(t1,t 1 +1 ) .L e t t2 = t1 +1and denote the history generated by h2 ∈ H(t2).
Since no one leaves between [t1,t 2),s oN(h1)=N(h2).




Everyone is quiet between (t2,t 2 +1 ) .L e tt3 = t2 +1and denote the history










28The second equality follows because no one leaves between [t2,t 3),s oN(h2)=
N(h3) and K(h2)=K(h3). The third equality follows because no new oﬀers
binds between [t2,t 3).T h u sa l lp l a y e r si nN(h2) accept the proposal at time t3.
Everyone is quiet between (t3,t 3 +1 ) .L e tt4 = t3 +1and denote the history
generated by h4 ∈ H(t4).
Since no one leaves between [t3,t 4),s oN(h3)=N(h4) and K(h3)=K(h4).










However zi(h2)=b zi(h1) because at time t1, p(h1) binds. Combining with
b zi(h1)=zi(h1),t h u szi(h2)=zi(h1)=zi(h). The last equality follows because
nothing happens between [t,t1).16 Thus player i ∈ N(h) gets zi(h) in the
continuing equilibrium. QED
The following result is the partial converse to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. If <N ,P>is totally r-balanced, then any payoﬀ vector in
the r-core can be supported as an SSPNE outcome.
Proof. We want to show that the strategy f does constitute an equilibrium.
Therefore, we want to show that any player i has no proﬁtable deviation after
any history, given all others are playing according to the equilibrium. For any
t ≥ 0, h ∈ H(t) and i ∈ N(h)\A(h),i ffj(h)=l for some j ∈ N(h)\{i},
then according to the equilibrium strategies, it must be the case that Π(h)=
{(·,N(h))}. Hence player i has to leave anyway. So fi(h)=l is clearly optimal.
Thus we only need to show that for any t ≥ 0, h ∈ H(t) and i ∈ N(h)\A(h),
if fj(h) 6= l for all j ∈ N(h)\{i}, then using the equilibrium strategy fi given
all others are using their corresponding equilibrium strategies f−i is optimal for
player i.
16Hence N(h)=N(h1) and K(h)=K(h1).
29Consider another strategy f0
i for player i.N o t i c et h a tf0
i and f−i generate a
unique continuation path h0 subsequent to h.S i n c ei gets at least zi(h) > −∞
by following fi, he does no better if he never leaves according to f0
i.T h u s
suppose i leaves at time t0 ≥ t with the proposal ((w0
j)j∈S0,S0).N o t i c e t h a t
since others are following the equilibrium strategies f−i, everyone must leave




N for all S ∈ K(h) and S0 ∈ P0
N.
That is, it must respect the coalitions that have left. Thus player i obtains
the payoﬀ of w0
iP(S0 |P 0
N).S i n c et h ep r o p o s a l((w0
j)j∈S0,S0) must be binding
before the coalition S0 can leave, thus ((w0









The equality follows because after S0 has left, since others are playing accord-
ing to the equilibrium strategies, they must stay together and form a grand
coalition of their own. Thus, P0
N = {N(h0|t0)\S0} ∪ {S0} ∪ K(h0|t0).M o r e -
over, the payoﬀ vector x(N(h0|t0)\S0 | S0,K(h0|t0)) is in the core C(N(h0|t0)\S0 |
N(h0|t0)\S0,S0,K(h0|t0)), and by total r-balancedness, P(N(h0|t0)\S0 | N(h0|t0)\S0,S0,K(h0|t0)) =




S0,K(h0|t0)) = P(S0 |P 0
N).
There are three exhaustive cases.
Case A: A(h)=∅.
Case B: p(h)=( ( wj)j∈T,T) and either b zi(h) ≤ zi(h) or b zj(h) <z j(h) for
some j ∈ T\A(h).
Case C: p(h)=( ( wj)j∈T,T), b zi(h) >z i(h) and b zj(h) ≥ zj(h) for all j ∈
T\A(h).
Notice that case B covers the instances where i/ ∈ T since then b zi(h)=zi(h).
Case A covers the instances where p(h)=∅. As in Perry and Reny (1994), the
argument applying to cases A and B have a common component, thus we treat
30them together until it is necessary to separate them.
Cases A and B. By Lemma 2, in case A, player i will get zi(h) by using the
equilibrium strategy fi. In case B, by the equilibrium strategies, either player
i does not belong to T, he is the only player who hasn’t accepted the current
proposal p(h) and will accept it or at least a player will reject the proposal by
making a new proposal involving all the players N(h).I n a n y c a s e , p l a y e r i
gets zi(h). Thus suppose to the contrary that by following f0
i,p l a y e ri made a
proﬁtable deviation. Thus w0
iP(S0 |P 0
N) >z i(h).
Since zi(h0|t0) ≥ w0
iP(S0 |P 0
N) >z i(h),i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tt0 >t .T h i s
is because h0|t = h. Hence, let
t∗ =i n f{b t ∈ [t,t0] | zi(h0|b t) >z i(h)}.
It follows that zi(h) ≥ zi(h0|t∗).T os e et h i s ,n o t ei ft∗ = t,t h e ns i n c eh0|t = h,
the weak inequality is certainly true. If t∗ >tand suppose to the contrary
that zi(h) <z i(h0|t∗), then by (S4), there exists an ε>0 small enough so that
t∗ − ε>tand nothing happens between [t∗ − ε,t∗). Hence zi(h0|t∗ − ε
2)=
zi(h0|t∗) >z i(h).B u tt h e nt∗ is not the inﬁmum. Hence zi(h) ≥ zi(h0|t∗).T h i s
implies t∗ 6= t0 because zi(h0|t0) >z i(h).T h u st0 >t ∗.
Because zi(h) ≥ zi(h0|t∗) and t∗ is the inﬁmum, there must exist a sequence
of positive numbers {εn} where limn→∞ εn =0and zi(h0|t∗ + εn) >z i(h) ≥
zi(h0|t∗) for every εn. By (S4), there must exist an n∗ large enough such that
nothing happens between (t∗,t ∗+εn∗). Thus something must happen at time t∗
for otherwise it cannot be the case that zi(h0|t∗ + εn∗) >z i(h0|t∗).T h u se i t h e r
the current proposal p(h0|t∗) which contains player i becomes binding at t∗ or
someone leaves at t∗. The latter cannot happen because according to f0
i,p l a y e r
i leaves at t0 >t ∗.P l a y e r so t h e rt h a ni cannot leave at t∗ either for otherwise,
since they are playing according to the equilibrium strategies f−i, when one
leaves, all must leave, contradicting that player i leaves at t0 >t ∗. Therefore,
the current proposal p(h0|t∗) becomes binding at t∗.L e tp(h0|t∗)=( ( w∗
j)j∈S,S).
Notice that i ∈ S as argued.
Since the current proposal p(h0|t∗) becomes binding at t∗ and nothing hap-
31pens between (t∗,t ∗+εn∗),t h i si m p l i e st h a tb zi(h0|t∗)=zi(h0|t∗+εn∗). Because







b zj(h0|t∗).B e c a u s ei is in S, this implies that there
exists a player k in S such that b zk(h0|t∗) <z k(h0|t∗).W e n o w s e p a r a t e t h e
discussion for cases A and B.
Case A. Since p(h0|t∗) becomes binding at t∗ and at time t no one has
accepted any proposal because A(h)=∅,t h u sp l a y e rk must accept p(h0|t∗) at
some point of time tk ∈ [t,t∗].A tt h a tt i m e ,s i n c ek is playing according to the
equilibrium strategy, so b zk(h0|tk) ≥ zk(h0|tk).N o t e t h a t Π(h0|tk)=Π(h0|t∗),
N(h0|tk)=N(h0|t∗) and K(h0|tk)=K(h0|t∗) since p(h0|tk)=p(h0|t∗). Hence
b zk(h0|tk)=b zk(h0|t∗) and zk(h0|tk)=zk(h0|t∗). T h i si m p l i e st h a tb zk(h0|t∗) ≥
zk(h0|t∗), yielding a contradiction. Hence there is no proﬁtable deviation for
case A.
Case B. Note that p(h)=( ( wj)j∈T,T) will not bind. This is because if there
exists some j 6= i where j ∈ T\A(h) such that b zj(h) <z j(h), then he will not
accept the proposal and will make another proposal pertaining to N(h) at the
next integer time if no one has done so. If there exists no j 6= i where j ∈ T\A(h)
such that b zj(h) <z j(h),t h e ne i t h e rb zi(h)=zi(h) or b zi(h) <z i(h).W h e n
b zi(h)=zi(h), according to the equilibrium strategies, all j 6= i, j ∈ T\A(h) will
accept the proposal at the next integer time. Thus if player i a c c e p t sa sw e l l ,
the proposal will bind. However, once it binds, say at time t00,t h e np(h0|t00)=∅.
Since we have shown in Case A that no proﬁtable deviation is possible, player i’s
optimal strategy is to follow the equilibrium strategy fi from t00 on. This implies
i’s payoﬀ will be b zi(h)=zi(h) by using f0
i.S i n c eb zi(h)=w0
iP(S0 |P 0
N).T h i s
is in contradiction to w0
iP(S0 |P 0
N) >z i(h).W h e nb zi(h) <z i(h),t h e r ea r et w o
possibilities. Either there exists an j 6= i where j ∈ T\A(h) or {i} = T\A(h).
In the ﬁrst situation when there exists a j 6= i, j ∈ T\A(h), then according to
player j’s equilibrium strategy, he will not accept the proposal17 and will make
another proposal pertaining to N(h) if no on has done so. In the second situation
17Because according to the equilibrium strategy, player j will not accept p(h) since e zi(h) <
zi(h).
32where {i} = T\A(h),p l a y e ri will not accept the proposal. For if he did, say
at time t000,t h e np(h0|t000)=∅. Again, since we have shown in Case A that no
proﬁtable deviation is possible from t000 on, player i gets b zi(h) <z i(h), yielding
a contradiction. Therefore in all possible situations, p(h)=( ( wj)j∈T,T) will
not bind.
Since p(h0|t∗) becomes binding at t∗ and p(h)=( ( wj)j∈T,T) will not bind,
p(h0|t∗) must be proposed at time t or later but before t∗. Hence player k must
accept p(h0|t∗) at some point of time tk ∈ [t,t∗]. Now apply exactly the same
logic in case A to get a contradiction. Thus there is no proﬁtable deviation for
case B.
Case C. We will show that player i has no proﬁtable deviation. If player i
plays according to the equilibrium strategy fi, since all others are also playing
the equilibrium strategies, his payoﬀ is b zi(h) >z i(h). If instead player i deviates
to another strategy f0
i, there are two possibilities.
In the ﬁrst possibility p(h) becomes binding. This implies player i accepts
p(h) at some time t00. Since all other players accept p(h) by the equilibrium
strategies at the next integer time, say t000, this implies p(h) becomes binding at
max{t00,t 000}. Therefore p(h0|max{t00,t 000})=∅. By the argument in case A, it
is optimal for player i to follow the equilibrium strategy from time max{t00,t 000}
on. Hence player i’s payoﬀ from using f0
i is at most b zi(h).
In the second possibility p(h) does not become binding. This implies either
player i makes another proposal at some time t00 or i leaves before accept-
ing. In the ﬁrst situation, since others are playing according to the equilibrium
strategies, if the next integer time arrives before than or at t00, all others ac-
cept p(h) at the next integer time except player i. If the next integer time
arrives after t00, this new proposal is made before anyone has accepted it. Both
imply p(h0|t00)=∅. By the argument in case A, it is optimal for player i to
follow the equilibrium strategy from time t00 on. Hence player i’s payoﬀ from
using f0
i is at most zi(h). In the second situation where i leaves before ac-
cepting, it must be the case that player i is in a binding coalition Sk.A f t e r
Sk leaves, all players still play according to the equilibrium strategies. Thus
33x(N(h)\Sk | Sk,K(h)) is expected in the continuing equilibrium. Hence player




xj(N(h)\Sk | Sk,K(h)) ≤ zi(h) by part (a) of Lemma 1.
Thus there is no proﬁtable deviation for case C. QED
6 Discussion
We note that total r-balancedness indeed guarantees the existence of the r-core.
In fact, it makes a precise prediction that for any S and PN\S, P(S | S,PN\S)=
(S). When there is no externality across coalitions, it naturally boils down to
the standard notion of total balancedness. In addition, total r-balancedness
plays an important role in Theorem 2. More precisely, the assumption of total
r-balancedness is convenient for the following reasons.
First, suppose S1 has become binding. After this history, the relevant par-
tition function game is no longer <N , P> .S i n c e S1 cannot break apart,
we should instead treat S1 as a “composite player” and consider the “derived”
partition function consistent with the fact that members of S1 stay together.
According to Theorem 1, whenever this happens, in the continuing equilibrium
some r-core of this “derived” partition function game must occur. The existence
of the r-core for this “derived” partition function game is not guaranteed, how-
ever, since the existence of the r-core only implies that when every player is on
its own, the r-core for any reduced society exists. For totally r-balanced games,
since the grand coalition for any reduced society always form, treating S1 as
a “composite player” actually reduces the number of the inequalities to check
for the r-core to exist. For instance, suppose S1 = {1,2} and N = {1,2,3,4}.
When we treat S1 as a “composite player,” for the grand coalition N to form
in the “derived” partition function form game, we do not need to worry, for
instance, whether the sum of payoﬀso fp l a y e r s1a n d3i sg r e a t e rt h a nt h e i r
worth. Therefore, if the r-core exists in the original game, then it exists in this
“derived” partition function game. The grand coalition is always the resulting
r-core structure. When the game is not totally r-balanced, existence may be a
problem. Example 2 demonstrates this.







and P(S |P N)=0in all other cases. For this game V ({1,2,3})=V ({1,2,4})=
2, V ({1})=V ({2})=V ({3,4})=1and the values for all other coalitions are
zero. The r-core exists and the unique r-core structure for the society N is
({1},{2},{3,4}).
However, suppose oﬀ the equilibrium path {1,2} has formed. Treating {1,2}
as a composite player, there exists no r-core in this “derived” partition function
form game. This is because now the value of {3,4} becomes 2 since players 1
and 2 cannot break apart. Combined with the fact that the values of {1,2,3}
and {1,2,4} are 2, there is no way to give each coalition its worth. Therefore,
oﬀ the equilibrium path, when {1,2} has formed, no continuation equilibrium
exists.
Second, suppose the r-core structure is not the grand coalition. After some
coalitions in the r-core structure have formed, since we have to treat the formed
coalitions as “composite players,” it is not guaranteed that the resulting r-core
in the “derived” partition function is the original r-core anymore. For the same
reason as argued above, when the game is totally r-balanced, this does not result
in a problem. Example 3 demonstrates this.








and P(S |P N)=0in all other cases. For this game, V ({3,4})=V ({1})=
V ({2})=V ({3})=V ({4})=1and the values for all other coalitions are
zero. The r-core exists and the unique r-core structure for the society N is
({1,2},{3},{4}).
However, suppose {1,2} has formed. Treating {1,2} as a composite player,
the unique r-core structure in this “derived” partition function form game is
({1,2},{3,4}). This is because now the value of {3,4} becomes 3 since players
1 and 2 cannot break apart.
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